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Note: This essay was commissioned and written circa 1997 for The
Cambridge Companion to Frege, which has not yet appeared.  Although quite a bit
of good work on Frege and Dedekind’s mathematical antecedents has since
appeared (by Jeremy Avigad, Jamie Tappenden and others), I think this essay still
provides the student with a useful introduction to many of the central issues.  I
have since refined my own conception of Frege’s originally intended procedures,
which I have also posted on this site as “Ghost World: A Context for Frege’s
Context Principle.” 
Although Gottlob Frege was a professional mathematician, having trained at
one of the world's greatest centers for mathematical research, it has been common
for modern commentators to assume that his interests in the foundations of
arithmetic were almost wholly "philosophical" in nature, unlike the more
"mathematical" motivations of a Karl Weierstrass or Richard Dedekind.  As Philip
Kitcher expresses the thesis:
The mathematicians did not listen [to Frege because]... none of the
techniques of elementary arithmetic cause any trouble akin to the
problems generated by the theory of series or results about the
existence of limits.  2
Indeed, Frege's own presentation of his work easily encourages such a reading. 
Nonetheless, recent research into Frege's professional background reveals ties to a
rich mathematical problematic that, pace Kitcher, was as central to the 1870's as
any narrow questions about series and limits per se.  An appreciation of the basic
facts involved, which this essay will attempt to describe in non-technical terms, can
only heighten our appreciation of the depths of Frege's thought and of the
continuing difficulties that philosophy of mathematics must confront. 
Furthermore, although it is probably possible to comprehend Frege's basic
approach to language on its own terms, some awareness of the rather unusual
examples that he encountered in the course of his mathematical work can only
enhance our understanding of his motivations within linguistic philosophy as well.
  To put Frege's problematic in its proper setting, it is useful to begin by
asking ourselves: how do we determine whether a purported mathematical structure
exists?  Modern mathematical orthodoxy has settled upon the following response:
2mathematics is free to study any subject that can be legitimated as a well defined
class within the set theoretical hierarchy.  This view can be called set theoretic
absolutism, for it makes reduction to set theory the final arbiter of mathematical
existence.  Although such ontological absolutism is "official policy" today, most
mathematicians (who often don't like set theory much) harbor in their bosoms a
rather different view of mathematical existence, which we can dub naïve
structuralism: mathematics should be free to study the properties of any self-
consistent, free standing construct.  No barriers should interfere with a
mathematician's right to study any structure she chooses.
The adjectival "free standing" marks the gulf that divides set theoretic
absolutism from naïve structuralism.  An example will illustrate the contrast. 
Modern physics informs us that our universe possesses the structure of a so-called
"four-dimensional, Lorentzian manifold".  In a geometry of this kind, our familiar
Euclidean notion of "distance" is replaced by a "distance" relationship that can take
on negative values and where distinct spacetime points are allowed to lie zero
"distance" apart.  Indeed, inside such spacetimes no "spaces" of an Euclidean type
typically subsist (under a natural understanding of "subsist").  Nonetheless, an
orthodox mathematical treatment of Lorentzian manifolds renders their
mathematical existence parasitical on whether pieces of these supposed structures
can be mapped into Euclidean spaces.  In other words, mathematical practice is
unwilling to treat the existence of Lorentzian manifolds as a matter that can "stand
free" of the existence of Euclidean spaces, even though in nature the first happily
exists without the latter.  Worse yet, mathematics requires the existence of the
Euclidean spaces to turn upon the existence of certain largish sets.  Isn't this odd? 
We live smack in the middle of a structure that mathematics won't accept without
taking a long excursus through sets, objects that still worry many of us as teetering
on the edge of paradox.  Naïve structuralists grumble accordingly, "Well, I guess I
can tolerate set theory's authoritarian sway over ontology as long as it promises to
give me everything I would wish to study anyway".  
Why should set theory be assigned this odd epistemological privileging, so
contrary to the preferences of a naïve structuralist?   Why can't a mathematician3
simply dream up any structure she wants and let it tell her what is true therein? 
The devastating reply to such a philosophy of genial tolerance is that unfortunate
mistakes have been introduced under the banner of ontological freedom.  Perhaps
the most famous illustration of this danger was provided by the celebrated work in
complex function theory by G.F.B. Riemann, a history that was well known to
Frege, as his teacher Alfred Clebsch labored mightily that render Riemann
3mathematically respectable.  Riemann had urged that the behavior of many
functions can be better understood if placed upon a so-called "Riemann surfaces",
figures that cannot be interpreted in terms of familiar spatial forms.  For example,
the Riemann surface associated with %x is an odd sort of structure like a two floor
parking garage except that one drive through this garage continuously and never
cut through a floor.  To prove key facts about his surfaces, Riemann relied upon an
existence criterion he dubbed "Dirichlet's Principle": if a collection of functions
can be graded by positive number assignments, then some minimal function must
exist within this set.  A simple illustration  of this principle is the following. 4
Suppose one has a wire rim of some shape and places a soap film across it.  A soap
film stores energy according its degree of bending; we can use a film's total amount
"stored energy" as the "positive number" cited in Dirichlet's principle.  Intuitively
we expect the soap film to settle into the shape that that attaches to the wire with
the least amount of stored energy.  Dirichlet's principle simply declares that at least
one minimal surface with the least amount of stored energy must exist (it is
possible that several cofigurations might store the same quantity of energy).
Unfortunately, this principle cannot be true in general: let our "rim" consist a
regular oval plus a single point above its center.  Consider the sequence of shapes
C , C ,... Note that the amount1 2
of bending can be decreased
continuously but never reach a
minimal surface: the proper
"limit" C  of all these shapes4
contains a discontinuous
"jump" that disqualifies it as a
surface altogether.  Without some deep repair, Dirichlet's Principle cannot be
regarded as reliable.
So while Riemann enjoyed the luxury of discovering wonderful results by
daydreaming about his sometimes impossible surfaces, the mathematicians who
came after were forced to "redo Riemann" by searching out mathematically
grounded expedients that might support his results.  Much of Weierstrass' fussing
about how power series piece together, for example, arose as a means of building a
solid structure underneath Riemann-like results. 
The moral is that postulating new structures in mathematics can be risky
unless reliable assurance is supplied that such structures exist.  In the specific case
of Riemann's work, most mathematicians of Frege's time did not attempt to
legitimate Riemann's original picture, but simply replaced his surfaces with more
4orthodox sections of mathematical ontology.  However, much of Frege's own
philosophy of mathematics seems to have emerged from an established program
for certifying other novel mathematical objects.  This is the movement I shall call
"relative logicism" later in the essay. 
By the mid-nineteenth century it was realized that astonishing progress
could be made in a wide variety of subjects if new entities were admitted into
mathematics' traditional realms.  There were many of these; we shall mainly
discuss "ideal" numbers and points here (such supplementary objects will be
lumped together under the generic title "extension elements").  Philosophically,
however, no rationale stood ready to tolerate these novel elements.  The century
had begun under the dominion of Immanuel Kant, who believed that the scope of
mathematics could reach only to the arithmetical and geometrical questions
legitimated within our a priori "intuitions" of quantity and quality.  To understand
the strong hold of Kantian thinking (to the best of our knowledge Frege never
abandoned the conviction that Kant was correct about the sources of geometrical
validity), we must avoid conceptualizing "intuition" crudely as a little bird that
whispers necessary propositions in our ear.  Perform the following thought
experiment (usually associated with Moritz Pasch's work in geometry).  Construct
an arbitrary triangle and extend one of the sides.  Select a point A on this line and
draw a straight line L over to some B on the near side of the triangle.  Is there any
way that L can avoid hitting the remaining side at C?  It seems not.  But what
allows us to know that L can't escape the triangle before
it reaches C?  It surely can't be a matter of logic for,
insofar as logic cares, L can exit the triangle before it
encounters the other side. Something else, it seems,
forces L to meet the remaining side: some principle of
conceptual closure that arises, in Kant's diagnosis, from
the structuring of our intuitive faculties.  
By attending to cases like this, one can develop a
proper sympathy for the view that some extensive branch of mathematical
knowledge can be founded in this array of intuitions.  One can retain this
conviction without denying that mathematics can be allowed, if sufficient rationale
is provided, to study quasi-"geometrical" structures in which such intuitions fail
(Frege, in fact, did study "geometries" of this kind).  Unlike Kant, one might allow
physics to decide on empirical grounds that Euclidean geometry is not directly
instanced in the physical world before us (or to agree with Henri Poincare that the
question of geometry's physical instantiation is a matter of scientific convention). 
5One can even concede, in company with the young Bertrand Russell, that proper
Kantian intuition does not reach to everything Euclid proved: any Euclidean
propositions that involve the equality of angles or lengths tacitly incorporate
considerations of measurement whose results can only reflect what empirically
transpires when instruments are moved around in physical space. 
A neo-Kantian can cheerfully make all of these concessions without altering
in any material way the conviction that, epistemologically, the ultimate source of a
large portion of mathematics' great store of knowledge traces to those otherwise
unexplained "intuitively forced closures" that we witnessed with respect to Pasch's
triangle configuration.  Kant also believed that our numerical knowledge stemmed
from related "intuitions of temporal succession", but many mathematicians before
Frege found this diagnosis less convincing and believed that some essentially
different grounding must stand behind our knowledge of numbers. 
Whatever story one develops about our geometrical and arithmetical
"sources of mathematical knowledge", one is certain to be puzzled by the
unexpected extension elements that began appearing in mathematics' traditional
dominions.  As we'll see, nineteenth century geometry began to tolerate "ideal
points at infinity" and "ideal points of intersection" between circles and lines that
do not visibly cross (such points were assigned Cartesian coordinates that took
complex numbers as values).  Strange "ideal numbers", also described below,
began to pop up in algebra. 
From a modern perspective, it may seem odd that these rather specialized
extension elements posed the primary challenge to Kantian methods of
rationalizing mathematical practice.  Prima facie, one might have expected that the
growing importance of complex analysis (the use of the calculus over complex
numbers) would have provided sufficient prompting to question Kant's limited
picture of mathematics' ontological prospects.  After all, mathematicians like
Cauchy, Gauss and Abel forced ordinary looking functions (say, the rule that
reports arc length along a planetary orbit) to take values over the complex
numbers, a project that sounds totally nonsensical at first telling.  However, the
complex numbers themselves can be viewed as simply filling an intuitionally
tolerated void that traditional mathematics had overlooked.  Such numbers can be
pictured as vectors within a two dimensional space (that is, as arrows upon the
complex plane).  A transitional thinker like Sir William Hamilton could then argue
that the study of such "vectors" was as directly grounded in our "intuitions" of the
plane as regular real numbers were founded upon the line.   Such musings led5
various algebraists to search for further extensions of number that might answer to
6our "intuitions" of three dimensional vectors, investigations that eventually
produced the somewhat unsatisfactory quaternions. 
However, by the time Frege had commenced his foundational studies, a
novel set of proposals for rationalizing the admission of the extension elements had
emerged.  This is the program I will dub relative logicism.  To understand what I
have in mind here, we need to look more closely at the specific character of the
"extension elements" at issue.  I will begin with the "ideal numbers" of algebra and
consider their geometrical cousins later.  We shall find that many characteristic
elements within Frege's philosophical thinking stem directly from two schools that
once flourished under the "relative logicist" banner. 
The key impetus to the creation of "ideal numbers" came in 1801 when C.F.
Gauss wrote of "complex integers" in his Disquisitiones Ariuthmeticae.   In itself, a6
"complex integer" is nothing new; it is simply a number of the form a + bi where
and b are normal integers (=  "whole numbers") and i = %-1.  One of the most
salient facts about the regular integers is that they break uniquely into prime factors
(i.e., 24 can be only expressed as 2x2x2x3) whereas a more general number such as
π or 6 - 2i can seemingly be broken into myriad sets of factors.  The great
advantage of prime factors is that they allow a great deal of control over the
integers that is lost within the more general fields of number.  But Gauss realized
that if we remain within a restricted orbit of complex numbers--those "complex
integers"--, then a variety of unique factorization persists, with all the advantages
to be gathered therefrom.  Unique factorization allowed Gauss to answer certain
important questions in number theory quite easily, e.g. how to characterize all
integers whose fourth powers give a remainder of n when divided by p.  In other
words, if we envision the regular integers as enriched with a halo of "complex
integers", the commonalities of behavior amongst the regular integers become
more transparent.  This fact impressed Gauss greatly: 
It is simply that a true basis for the theory of the biquadradic residues
[i.e., the questions about fourth powers] is to be found only by making
the field of the higher arithmetic, which usually covers only the real
whole numbers, include also the imaginary ones, the latter being
given full equality of citizenship with the former.  As soon as one has
perceived the bearing of this principle, the theory appears in an
entirely new light, and its results become surprisingly simple .7
In the 1840's, treating matters connected to Gauss' work and Fermat's "last
theorem", E. E. Kummer realized that unique factorization was again lost in certain
further sets of generalized "integers".  Consider the "integers" that arise when %15
is added to the rational numbers.  In this range of numbers, 10 breaks into
7irreducible factors in two distinct ways: as 2.5 and (5 + %15)(5 - %15).  If we only
had further factors to work with, e.g. %5 and %3, unique factorization could be
restored because 2 = (%5 + %3)(%5 - %3), 5 = (%5) , 5 + %15 = %5(%5 + %3) and 5 -2%15 = %5(%5 - %3).  In such terms, 10 can be seen as "really" decomposing into
(%5)(%5)(%5 + %3)(%5- %3) and the apparent non-unique factorizations of 10 is
explained by pairing these four basic elements in different ways.  However, we
were supposed to be considering the integers that can built up employing %15 as
sole additional element; we can't simply throw %5 and %3 in with these, as their
closure will generate lots of numbers we don't want.  Kummer finessed these issues
in an intriguing way: all we really need is some number to serve as a highest
commonality between 2 and 5 + %15 (and ditto for the other pairings); we don't
need to represent it concretely by "%5 + %3" or anything else.  So let the pairing8
"(2, 5 + %15)" serve as the name of an ideal number to supplement our original set
of %15 numbers and not worry about its nature any further.  He wrote:
In order to secure a sound definition of the true (usually ideal) prime
factors of complex numbers, it was necessary to use the properties of
prime factors of complex numbers which hold in every case and which
are entirely independent of the contingency of whether or not actual
decomposition takes place; just as in geometry, if it is the question of
the common chords of two circles even though the circles do not
intersect, one seeks an actual definition of these ideal common chords
which shall hold for all positions of the circles.  There are several
such permanent properties of complex numbers which could be used
as definitions of ideal prime factors..., I have chosen one as the
simplest and most general...One sees therefore that ideal prime
factors disclose the inner nature of complex numbers, make them
transparent, as it were, and show their inner crystalline nature.  9
We are supposed to picture the situation as follow.  We first isolate a group of
generalized "integers".  The behavior of that group will naturally cry out for
supplementary "ideal numbers" to allow the group to consolidate into a fully
satisfactory domain.  In a famous letter to L. Kronecker, Kummer compares this
process to the postulation of unseen elements in chemistry, a particularly apt
comparison because in the chemical doctrine of Kummer's time such "elements"
(like the quarks of modern science) were never supposed to appear in "naked" form
in nature.  In the quotation above, Kummer further justifies his practice by appeal
to the manner in which geometers like Jean Victor Poncelet had cited so-called
"permanence of form" to add supplements to the ontology of standard Euclidean
geometry, a matter to which we'll return.
8In the case at hand, Kummer notes that there are standard divisability tests
that provide a "yes" or "no" answer as to whether two regular integers share a
common factor and that these tests continue to give meaningful answers even when
applied to non-standard pairs like 2 and 5 + %15.  For Kummer, the fact that
divisibility tests applicable to the natural numbers can still be run upon the
generalized integers is sufficient reason to allow mathematics to postulate ideal
numbers to corrrelate with positive answers to these tests.  Of course, once these
supplements are accepted, Kummer needed to provide what Frege called
"recognition statements"--tests that can further determine whether (2, 5 + %15)
represents the same ideal factor as (3, 3 + %15).  
Even Frege's most causal readers will recognize that Kummer's fuzzy
justification for extending his number ranges would have seemed like anathema to
Frege, both in respect to the sloppy idea that the "permanence" of certain
divisability tests provides an adequate "definition" of ideal numbers and the conceit
that the extensions can be methodologically justified by analogy with physics'
postulation of unseen entities.  On the other hand, Kummer's results clearly
represented a great advance in the theory of numbers and some rationale for the
practice needed to be found.
In 1871, Richard Dedekind suggested both an improvement and a
rationalization of Kummer's approach in a famous supplement to his edition of
Dirichlet's lectures on number theory .  He asked, "What does Kummer want his10
"ideal numbers to do?"  Answer: to serve as divisors of a certain collection of
regular numbers.  Why not let the entire set of numbers we want divided to count
as the missing "ideal number" itself?  That is, replace "ideal number" (2, 5 + %15)
by the infinite set {2, 3, 3 + %15, 5 + %15, 4,... }, a set that does not priviledge any
particular representation of the factor.  Dedekind explained:
[I]t has seemed desirable to replace the ideal number of Kummer,
which is never defined in its own right,... by a noun for something that
actually exists...11
Dedekind's sets, which he dubbed "ideals", are distinguished by the fact that they
are closed under the property that if elements λ and µ are already in the ideal, then
so is αλ + βµ, where α and β are any rational numbers.  Dedekind suggested that
we reinterpret Kummer's procedure as follows: rather than adding "ideal numbers"
into a range of numbers R,we "jump up" from R to a level of sets by considering
all the "ideal" sets that can be manufactured from R.  The original numbers in R 
become replaced at the set level by their "principle ideal" surrogates, viz., the sets
that consist of all multiples of a single R element.  The advantage of working
9within this higher domain of sets is that, unlike in R , unique factorization obtains. 
This format for interrelating structures, where one domain is built from another
through set theoretic processes, is now standard in modern algebra courses.   
The basic trick displayed here--manufacturing "new" entities by forming sets
of old objects--is, of course, employed by Frege in his construction of the natural
numbers, which wind up treated as equivalence classes of concepts whose
extensions can be mapped to one another in one-one fashion.  As we shall see later,
the rationale Frege offers for this process is rather different than that suggested by
Dedekind.  Nonetheless, both men regarded these set theoretic transitions as
sanctioned by logic.  Once we allow the "laws of thought" to construct new
structures from previously existent materials, we have provided a resolution to the
puzzle of the extension elements that does not drastically upset mathematics' claim
to be a priori and grounded in intuitive sources of knowledge.  Logic alone can
build the extension elements needed to bring a traditional mathematical domain to
satisfactory ontological completion.   I call this program "relative logicism"
because it asks logic to construct new elements once a base structure has been set
in place. 
To be sure, both Frege and Dedkind were also "absolute logicists" with
respect to number, but we will set these matters largely to the side here.
To the modern reader, relative logicism's appraisal of "logic"'s capabilities
may seem rather startling, as we no longer expect that "logic" can be so "creative"
as to build mighty towers of set theoretic structures on top of any base domain.  On
the contrary, a "first order" understanding of logic tolerates universes containing a
solitary object; it does not feel obliged to move onto sets at all.  But this is entirely
a modern point of view.  Nineteenth century logic tutors were usually cavalier
about what we call "first order inference" (often presuming that it was somehow
covered by traditional syllogistics), but would wax garruously expansive on the
alleged stages that "logic" runs through as it presses onward through increasingly
lofty levels of abstract construction. 
It was common in many of these texts to appeal to an alleged constructive
process of "abstraction": one surveys a range of concrete objects and abstracts
their commonality.  Dedekind almost certainly viewed his invocation of set theory
as a mathematical precisification of the "abstraction" process described by the
logicians.   Undoubtedly the idea of replacing Kummer's ideal number (2, 5 +12%15) by {2, 3, 3 + %15, 5 + %15, 4,... } occurred to him because the latter set
represented the objects from whose commonality Kummer had extracted his
number.  Indeed, the well known Italian geometer Fredrigo Enriques explicitly
10
rationalized Dedekind's procedures in this vein: 
For it can be admitted that entities connected by such a relation [of
equivalence class type] possess a certain property in common, giving
rise to a concept which is a logical function of the entities in question
and which is in this way defined by abstraction.13
In fact, Dedekind pursued this analogy a step further by recommending that, after
one has "jumped up" into the required set theoretical realm, the abstractive process
should be completed by replacing these sets by "freely created" mathematical
objects that retain only the properties we really need.  In an often quoted letter to
H. Weber, Dedekind wrote, referring to his famous articulation of real numbers as
sets (= "sections" or "cuts") of rational numbers:
You say that the irrational number ought to be nothing other than the
section itself, whereas I prefer it to be created as something new
(different from the section) which corresponds to the section and
produces the section.  We have the right to allow ourselves such a
power of creation and it is more appropriate to proceed thus, on
account of treating all numbers equally .14
The idea is that, although the set theoretical filigree binding the real numbers to the
rationals is needed to confer concrete properties upon the reals (in contrast to
allegedly fuzzy procedures like Kummer's), these moorings can be erased once we
have established our right to treat the real numbers as a "free standing" structure. 
However, many German logicians--.e.g., C. Sigwart--maintained that logic
did not build its higher structures through "abstraction" of this sort.  On the
contrary, such "abstractive processes" can go forward only if logic has available to
it a rich supply of well-articulated concepts beforehand.  Frege, we can presume,
was more sympathetic to this school of logic for the complaints that Frege directs
towards "abstractive" accounts of the origin of number in the Grundlagen very
much resemble criticisms typical of the "anti-abstractionists".  Later we'll examine
the logical processes that replace abstraction within Frege's philosophy of
mathematics.  By an odd twist of fate, within the folklore of modern philosophy
Frege is often portrayed as the thinker who tried to argue "philosophically" that
numbers had to be identified with sets of equinumerous concepts because that
identification was the only proposal that abstracts properly from all of number's
potential applications, whereas the more "mathematical" Dedekind sought only to
articulate "freely created" objects sufficient "to do a mathematical job". But there is
little textual evidence to attribute such motivations to Frege.  
Before we look into an alternative version of relative logicism with which
Frege bore greater philosophical affinities, there is an important commonality
11
between Dedekind and Frege that is worth noting.  By the 1870's, many
mathematicians had come to feel that, when an infinitely iterated process is under
consideration, only logic can determine the nature of its closure.  Recall the
peculiar configuration C  that emerges as the limit of shapes C , C ,..., discussed in4 1 2
connection with Dirichlet's principle.  Prior mathematicians made serious
mathematical mistakes when they assumed that they could "intuit" the properties
that C  will inherit from its generating C -chain when, in point of fact, only a4 i
logical investigation can settle which traits will persist in the limit (thus, in the
soap film case, "possesses a continuous surface" fails to carry over from the C  toi
the C ).  Using the logical resources codified in Frege's Begriffsschrift (i.e.,4
relational expressions and both multiple and second-order quantification), the
configuration C  and all of its properties become perfectly well-defined in terms of4
the rule that generates the C .  So no room remains for any fresh "intuition" (a lai
Dirichlet's principle) to assign C  any further attributes.  Accordingly, "relative4
logicism" must be true of mathematical structures introduced as the limits of
infinitely iterated processes; it is but a small step to assume that "intuition" is not
needed in Dedekind-style constructions either.
  In this vein (and influenced by his research into algebraic numbers and
Galois theory), Dedekind observes that, insofar as "intuition" underwrites the truth
of Euclid's basic postulates, such "intuitions" do not force space to be continuous,
for 
all constructions that occur in Euclid's Elements, can, so far as I can
see, be just as accurately effected [in an algebraically constructed
discontinuous] space; the discontinuity of this space would not be
noticed in Euclid's science, would not be felt at all....All the more
beautiful it appears to me that without any notion of measurable
quantities and simply a finite number of simple thought-steps man can
advance to the creation of the pure continuous number domain; and
only by this means in my view is it possible for him to render the
notion of continuous space clear and definite.   15
In other words, although the constructions permitted by Euclid force us to place
points on a straight line at distances %2, 2%2, etc., the totality of all these
constructions still leave a line with many gaps in it.  Dedekind claims it is entirely
our logical faculty that induces us to fill in these gaps, not "intuition".
In a revealing passage where Frege compares the merits of his system of
logic to weaker systems such as Boole's or, for that matter, Aristotle's, he turns this
same theme to positive advantage: 
If we look at the [concepts that be defined in a logic like Boole's], we
12
notice that...the boundary of the concept...is made up of parts of the
boundaries of concepts already given...It is the fact that attention is
primarily given to this sort of formation of new concepts from old
ones...which is surely responsible for the impression one easily gets in
logic that for all our to-ing and fro-ing we never really leave the same
spot....[But i]f we compare what we have here with the definitions
contained in our examples of the continuity of a function and of a limit
and again that of following a series which I gave in §26 of my
Begriffsschrift, we see that there's no question there of using the
boundary lines we already have to form the boundaries of the new
ones.  Rather totally new boundary lines are drawn by such
definitions--and these are the scientifically fruitful ones.  16
Frege's point is the following.  Suppose we start with concepts A, B and C.
From these, traditional formal logic can only build simple compounds like (A &
-B) v C, which corresponds to a certain region within a standard trio of Euler's
circles (a.k.a. "Venn diagrams").  Note that the boundary of (A & -B) v C will be
comprised of arcs from the circles A,B,C.  If logic could range no further from
home base than that, its powers would truly be as circumscribed as critics like Kant
had claimed.  But consider the shape C  that logic constructs when permitted its4
full resources.  The boundary is "totally new", not coincident with any of the C .  i
Although many of Dedekind's overridding concerns resembled Frege's, the
second mathematician seems to have derived much of his idiosyncratic and non-
"abstractive" picture of how numbers arise from attitudes that were once current
within geometry, the subject of his thesis work and much of his teaching.  Once
again, the motivating problematic revolved around the question of how traditional
geometry could tolerate the peculiar "extension elements" that nineteenth century
geometers had added to its dominions.  
There are two basic strands within geometry that we need to discuss.  The
first centers on the peculiar way in which the Erlangen geometer Karl von Staudt
employed concepts as replacements for missing geometrical objects.  Greek
geometers had been intrigued by the
phenomenon of harmonic division: the pairing
of distances upon a line keeps the product of the
displacements equal to 1.  Consider this division
as a function (= mapping) from x to x' and look
at the products that, more generally, supply a
constant positive number n.  An unexpected recipe (which the unambitious reader
needn't follow in detail) for constructing divisions of this sort (whose proper name
13
is "involution") was discovered: (i) Intersect L with a circle C. (ii) Draw tangents
from L's two intersections with C, a and b, to locate the "polar point" p. (iii) Run a
"pencil" (= bundle) of lines through p back to the circle C.  (iv) Pair off points y
and y' around the circle if they lie on a common chord from p. (v) Locate the
"vertex" v of the circle (the opposing
point whose tangent is parallel to L). 
(vi) Constructing a new pencil of lines
through v, transfer the y/y' mapping
down onto L, resulting in a mapping
x/x' along L.  This will be the desired
"involution" on L, which happens to
lay down a nesting in mirror image
around b.  The remarkable feature
about our roundabout construction is
that we have set up an involution
without using a ruler to measure
anything, despite the fact that our
starting definition of "division" was
based upon length.
After René Descartes and Pierre Fermat invented analytic geometry in the
1600's, it was found that each step in our recipe could be duplicated by
manipulation on formulae.  Starting with Cartesian equations for the circle and
line, solving for their intersections, then taking derivatives to produce the equations
for the tangents, etc., we will eventually stagger our algebraic way to a final
equation such as x.x' = n that, indeed, will graph as the involution supplied above.  
Somebody then noticed a strange fact.  What happens if we apply our recipe to
equations for lines and circles that don't intersect?  Well, if we do such a stupid
thing, we should expect a stupid answer: we obtain imaginary coordinates for the
"intersections" of the figures.  However, algebraic formulae accept complex
numbers as readily as real numbers, so let us calculate onward.  At stage (ii), we
obtain coordinates for a real pole p, but it now lies inside C.  Completing the
recipe, we obtain a mapping on L of involution type except the results are now
overlapping rather than nested.  Indeed, the final equation describing the mapping
still takes the form x.x' = n, but n has now shifted to become a negative number,
suggesting (if n = -1) that our associated points now lie at "harmonically divided"
imaginary distances around two imaginary points of intersection!  The strange
notion that figures that don't appear to intersect nonetheless cross in imaginary
14
points was originally inspired through algebraic manipulations such as this.
A whole raft of allied cases demonstrated that algebraic methods possess an
astounding ability to unify under a common treatment situations that, from a strict
geometrical point of view, seem unrelated.   But how does algebra manage to17
produce this unity?  Certain English mathematicians of the early nineteenth century
developed a rather mystical faith that the blind application of algebra would always
lead to correct results, even if the paths it pursues seem completely unintelligible. 
On this point of view, the imaginary points arrive, in the phrase of the
mathematician E. Hankel, as "a gift from algebra."  Bertrand Russell expressed the
obvious objection to this manner of thinking: 
As well might a postman presume that, because every house in a street
is uniquely determined by its number, therefore there must be a house
for every imaginable number.18
The great French geometer V. Poncelet, who pioneered the successful exploitation
of supplementary entities within geometry, suggested a alternative rationale that
did not rely upon any detour through alien branches of mathematics.  Poncelet
believed that mathematics could extend its natural domains through a primitive
"principle of continuity" (or, sometimes, of "persistence of form").  As H.J.S.
Smith explained the doctrine in 1851:
[I]f we once demonstrate a property for a figure in any one of its
general states, and if we then suppose the figure to change its form,
subject of course to the conditions with which it was first traced, the
property we have proved, though it may become unmeaning, can
never become untrue, even if every point and every line, by means of
which it was originally proved, should wholely disappear.19
The claim is that, since the properties (iii)-(vi) "persist" as we continuously pull
line L outside of the circle, we may postulate "unmeaning" (= without
representation in intuition) ideal points to support the continuation of properties
observed. Obviously, such a rationale for ontological extension seems even less
unconstrained than the "gift from algebra" story; it is as if our postman should posit
imaginary houses in vacant lots to domicile the dogs that chase him there.  As we
saw, Kummer cites this same rationale on behalf of his ideal numbers.
Beginning in the 1840's, the German geometer Karl von Staudt suggested a
very unusual program for converting "persistence of form" considerations into a
more respectible pattern of extending geometry by straightforward definitions. 
What is a property that "persists" as the circle and line pull apart?  Answer: the
property of defining a specific mapping along the line (e.g., "map x to 1/x").  Why
not let this mapping concept, running in a rightwards sense, become one of our two
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missing "imaginary intersections" (and let the leftgoing map count as the other)? 
As Hans Freudenthal  rightly remarks, the notion that an object's role could be20
served by a classificatory relational concept was unprecedented in mathematics,
but, once this unexpected pill is swallowed, von Staudt could rationalize all of
Poncelet's maneuvers through a straightforward, if tedious, program of definition. 
The trick is to amalgamate the new elements into the old world of geometry by
redefining old geometrical concepts to suit the new elements.  For example,
imaginary lines are also needed within our extended geometry but they can be
introduced in parallel fashion as involution maps upon the lines within a "pencil". 
This supplementation forces a reworking of the old geometrical notion of "lying
upon" (call it "lies upon ") so that imaginary points can "lie upon " imaginary lines. 1 2
And so forth.
Note that this program employs concepts directly as replacements for the
entities sought, rather than collecting sets in Dedekind's manner.  When von Staudt
introduced "points at infinity", he thought it sufficient to cite the concept of
direction as a "commonality" between parallel lines that could serve as their
missing "point of intersection".  When he desired a line at infinity, he merely
appealed to "the something that parallel planes have in common".  The reader will
note that these are precisely the concepts Frege studies in §§ 64-68 of the
Grundlagen as preparation for his approach to number.
The trick in this activity is to circumscribe the proper subset of concepts that
can generate the requisite number of missing objects.  Thus each non-intersecting
line and circle pair {L,C} must generate exactly two intersection points, but we
also need to determine when two pairs {L,C} and {L',C'} call up the same
intersections.  By choosing the property set up the same involution, von Staudt
finds a characteristic that settles this second identification question in the right way
(hence the involution relation becomes the crucial ingredient in what Frege calls
"the recognition statement" for imaginary points).  In all of these logical activities,
we create nothing: the realm of concepts is already there, with preestablished
standards of identity.  The "recognition statement" doesn't define identity in any
sense; it serves merely to foreground, out of the vast sea of candidate concepts, the
specific choice that can perfectly play the role of imaginary points.  This non-
creative approach to the introduction of new entities helps explain the significance
of  Frege's remark that he is not attempting
to define identity specially for this case, but to use the concept of
identity, taken as already known, as a means for arriving at that
which is to be regarded as being identical.21
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We are certain, by the way, that Frege knew von Staudt's work well, because
he refers to the latter's definitions several times and because these researches were
a prominent topic of discussion during Frege's stay in Gottigen.  However, Frege's
thinking about mathematical ontology was undoubtedly deepened by a further vein
of geometrical considerations that had been promoted by Julius Plücker (who had
died a few years before Frege attended his university).  Plücker introduced a
revolutionary new perspective which allowed previously understood "geometrical
contents" to be carved up in novel ways.  In so-called "homogeneous coordinates"
(see any college geometry text), the equation of a planar straight line looks like Ax
+ By + Cz = 0. Here we naturally think of the list of constants [A,B,C] acting upon
the range of variability (x,y,z).  In other words, this equation allows [A,B,C] to
carve out the range of points we call a straight line.  But what happens if we hold a
point (a,b,c) fixed and allow let the erstwhile [A,B,C] "constants" to vary, i.e., we
consider the equation Xa + Yb + Zc = 0?  Plücker proposed that we view this
equation as carving out the full pencil of lines through (a,b,c), whose individual
components bear "line coordinates" like [A,B,C].  To bring out the symmetries yet
further, let us rewrite the claim that "point (a,b,c) lies upon the line [A,B,C]"
matrix-multiplication style as "[A,B,C](a,b,c) = 0"  Then, according to whether the
[] block or the () block is regarded as open to variation, we will parse the
proposition as representing the action of a different "unsaturated" function acting
upon a different saturated "object" (borrowing the terminology Frege introduces in
"Concept and Object").  We shouldn't regard [A,B,C] when it acts as a function as
quite the same thing as [A,B,C] acting as an object, for otherwise, the thought, in
Frege's words, "would fall apart".  
Plücker's simple expedient tells us a lot.  A curve can be regarded as the
intersection of its tangent lines just as well as the union of its points.  Plücker
suggested that we examine what happens when the "point equation" of a curve is
reexpressed in terms of line coordinates, e.g., when we convert x  - y z =0 into 4X3 2 3
+ 27Y Z = 0.  If we now "picture" this second "dual" equation as if it were about2
points, the fact that the dual curve is also a cubic turns out to be an indication that
the original curve contains funny singularities that we might not have noticed.  It is
as if we looked at the curve through ultraviolet light and saw features we hadn't
noticed previously.  Through these means Plücker was able to articulate the
eponymous formulae that comprise the beginnings of what is now called "algebraic
geometry".
  Such work inspired a large number of attempts to reconfigure geometrical
intuition by carving space into different choices of basic "elements".  The most
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famous of these subsequent investigations was Sophus Lie's "sphere geometry",
but Frege himself worked upon a decomposition where the "elements" were pairs
of points treated as a fused unity.  For our purposes, note how hidden geometrical
facts are uncovered through a transference of "intuition" from one objective
content to another.  As I reconstruct his thinking, Frege viewed geometry in the
following terms: all of the original geometrical facts come to us through Kantian
intuition--we see how point (a,b,c) lies upon line [A,B,C]; that line L in our
Paschian triangle must land at C.  Nonetheless, by restructuring these contents à la
Plücker and adding new logic-based elements constructed in von Staudt's manner,
a restructuring can be articulated that will be able to carry a reassigned mantle of
"intuition".  Under such a transfer, the "objective content" of the original
geometrical fact remains constant, while its intuitive appearance shifts to a new
geometrical support.  That is, "geometrical content" is truly given to us in intuition,
but the objective content so delivered should not to be identified with the subjective
aspect of the intuitions themselves, which are private to each of us and can be
usefully transfered to other objective contents.  In § 26 of the Grundlagen, Frege
describes two people who have their intuitions assigned to different aspects of
geometrical reality:
Over all geometrical theorems they would be in complete agreement,
only interpreting the words differently in terms of their respective
intuitions.  With the word "point" for example, one would connect one
intuition and the other another.  We can therefore still say that this
word has for them an objective meaning, providing only that by this
meaning we do not understand any of the peculiarities of their
respective intuitions.
It therefore seems likely that Plücker-like considerations on the organization
of algebraic equations played some role in shaping Frege's conception of the
structuring of logic--why he claimed that his approach differed from Boole's in that 
instead of putting a judgement together out of an individual as subject
and an already previously formed concept as a predicate, we do the
opposite and arrive at the concept by splitting up the content of a
possible judgement...[T]he ideas of these properties and relations are
[not] formed apart from objects: on the contrary they arise
simultaneously with the first judgement in which they are ascribed to
things.  22
Frege's discussion of how the range of variability under consideration affects the
articulation of a judgement |- F(a) into function and concept strikes me as closely
analogous to the Plücker understanding of how we determine which factor serves
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as the active functional element within [A,B,C](a,b,c) = 0 (note also how Frege's
assertion sign "|-" compares with Plücker's "= 0").
This background helps clarify the "grammatical approach" to ontology that
forms so much of the Grundlagen's fabric: a term corresponds to an object if it can
fit in the grammatical locales proper to objects.  Specifically, if [A,B,C], qua
classifying function, is sufficiently defined so that it can determine for every (a,b,c)
whether it maps to 0 or not, then the (a,b,c)'s, considered in a dual role as
classifiers, must automatically also decide whether the [A,B,C]'s should be sent to
0 or not, so in that sense the [A,B,C] act under the (a,b,c)'s like proper objects. 
Indeed, such reasoning is still employed in linear algebra to argue that the
collection of linear functions over a vector space V constitute a dual vector space V
* of their own.  
Such thinking, however, leaves the basic elements of plane geometry (points
and lines) segregated into dualized domains (P and P *) when intuitively we desire
a unified universe (P c P *) where both sorts of object live.   To preserve the
distinction between function and object, we need a "transfer principle" that can
move some objectified surrogate for [A,B,C] into the (a,b,c) realm; call this
transferred entity (A,B,C).  This transfer allows the articulation of positive
statements such as "(a,b,c) is the intersection of (A,B,C) and (D,E,F)", which we
can define easily enough.  Unfortunately, we are also forced to make sense of
unwanted constructions like "[A,B,C](A,B,C)".   In the case at hand, we can simply
stipulate that all such pairings map to some number (37, say) different from 0.  The
project of making P c P * behave like a proper domain will require a long
sequence of definitions very much like those pioneered by von Staudt. 
 Such Plücker-like musings amplifies von Staudt's original picture in a
natural way.  Von Staudt's method of harnessing concepts as objects seems abrupt
and unnatural, whereas Plücker offers palliative considerations that allow objects
and classifying concepts to interconnect in intimate and interchangeable
relationships.  In none of this do Dedekind-style sets appear, utilized, for the
replacements for ideal points, etc. are discovered by carving up preexistent
thoughts in novel ways.  Such a program for introducing new entities better
accords, probably by coincidence, with the strictures of an "anti-abstractionist"
logician like Sigwart.
Many commentators  have wondered exactly what job in the formal23
development of the Grundlagen is Frege's famous context principle supposed to
serve, given the emphasis Frege assigns to its importance early on.  I believe that if
Frege had consistently pursued a pure von Staudt/Plücker strategy throughout, the
19
context principle's philosophical role would not seem mysterious.  As a rationale
for introducing ideal points, it would serve admirably.  However, as has often been
noted, Frege's deliberations take an abrupt turn in §68, when suddenly Dedekind-
like extensions enter the scene.  The background surveyed here suggests the
following speculation as to how Frege's thinking developed.  Rather early in his
career he formulated the general thesis that the real and complex numbers act as
logical classifiers of a specific relation R's place within a wider field F of relations
generated by certain basic relata G .  Or, more exactly, he expected these numbersi
to represent "objectified" surrogates for such classifying concepts.  In his
Begriffsschrift, he successfully articulated the logical tools needed to locate R's
place within F.  Turning to the natural numbers, Frege expected that they also
represent "objectified" surrogates for concepts, but classifiers that merely serve to
grade other concepts according to cardinality.  Once the requisite classifying
concepts had been sharply delineated, Frege originally expected that properly
"objectified" surrogates could be constructed by the von Staudt/Plücker strategy. 
He recognized that the problem of amalgamating dual domains would require a
long stream of semi-stipulative definitions , but presumed that it would all work24
out in ideal point fashion.  However, when he actually tried to frame these
"stipulations" in the course of writing the Grundlagen, he discovered that, at best,
the definitions would need to be baroquely tangled in an unexpected manner
(unlike the geometrical case, numerical classifiers must be constructed in a manner
that allows them to classify structures involving numbers themselves--e.g., "the
number of even numbers < 100 is 49").  In the meantime, Dedekind's use of sets in
both algebraic number theory and analysis had become well known within the
mathematical community.  Frege recognized that such classes were widely
accepted in logic under the rubric "concepts-in-extension" and, in some
desperation, decided to adopt Dedekind's ploy for establishing concept-surrogates
within the object domain rather than adhering to the contemplated von
Staudt/Plucker strategy.  Such a mid-stream switch would explain his puzzling
remark in § 68:
I believe that for "extension of the concept" we could simply write
"concept".  But this would be open to the two objections:
1. that this contradicts my earlier statement that
individual numbers are objects, as is indicated by the use
of the definite article in expressions like "the number
two" and by the impossibility of speaking of ones, twos,
etc. in the plural, as also by the fact that the number
constitutes only an element in the predicate of a
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statement of number; 
2. that concepts can have identical extensions 
without themselves coinciding.
I am, as it happens, convinced that both these objections can be met;
but to do this would take us too far afield for present purposes.  I
assume that it is well known what the extension of a concept is. 
That is, "I believe I could get my project to work utilizing a von Staudt/Plücker
strategy, but I will use Dedekind's trick so that I can finish my book!"  
If this reconstructed history is correct, it helps explain why the role of the
context principle seems so hazy in the Grundlagen and why the slogan is rarely
mentioned subsequently.  Dedekind's sets, in comparison to Plücker's more delicate
vein of thinking, represent fairly blunt instruments and their employment obscures
the considerations that connect the context principle to von Staudt-like
constructions.  Such an explanation would also explain why the notorious Axiom
V of the Grundgesetze, which articulates the Dedekind-style transition from the
realm of concepts into the realm of objects, emerges so tacitly within the
Grundlagen, accompanied by mumblings to the effect "we could do this in other
ways if we wish". 
In contrast to more radical approaches to the context principle's intended
purpose , the present suggestion places Frege's approach to ontological issues25
within the rather conservative framework tolerated by the von Staudt school, which
labored mightily to keep mathematics' traditional underpinnings more or less in
place in the face of the challenge presented by extension elements.  It is important
to stress, lest the reader be mislead, that the explication offered of the Grundlagen's
oddities is idiosyncratic to myself and is based largely upon a dating of when
Dedekind-like ideas entered the mathematical mainstream.  Such claims can be
adequately resolved only as more research is devoted to the mathematical and
philosophical community of Frege's time.  Although a large amount of rather
sophisticated discussion between mathematicians transpired, these events have
been left largely uncharted by historians.  26
However these specific issues sort themselves out, Frege's basic views about
mathematical ontology certainly were in general harmony with the "relational
logicism" of both von Staudt and Dedekind.  But within geometry, at least, von
Staudt's approach has long since vanished from the mathematical stage.  What
happened to it?  Its rapid demise can be dated quite precisely to the period of 1900-
1910 and is due almost entirely to the rising influence of David Hilbert's contrary
views on how issues of mathematical ontology should be addressed.  Frege, in fact,
engaged in a written exchange with Hilbert and his amanuensis A. Korselt, but
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these interchanges prove remarkably unrevealing.  Hilbert addressed Frege as if he
were a naïve fuddy-duddy who needed to be educated in the value of rigor in
geometry, failing to recognize that Frege was far more strict in his own
investigations than Hilbert had ever been.  On his side, Frege endlessly fusses
about the proper significance of "definition", etc., complaints that are well taken
but which nonetheless seem obtuse in light of the striking results Hilbert found. 
However, if we look into the details of one of these, we can better appreciate why
Hilbert's explications of their significance ran so directly against the grain of
relational logicism.
Consider the following observation.  First set up two intersecting planes of
glass and place a triangle upon the upper plate.  Shine a light through the plane to
form a shadow triangle on the lower plate.  If we extend the sides of the upper
triangle indefinitely, they will cast shadow lines that also extend the sides of the
lower triangle.  As the upper triangle's extended sides stretch to the line of
intersection between the two panes of glass, they
must be met along that line by the shadow lines
that extend the lower triangle's sides.  So much
should seem obvious.  But now reinterpret the
drawing we have just made as a purely two
dimensional arrangement lying within the plane
of the paper--that is, erase all the clues that lead
us to interpret the upper diagram as a spatial
configuration.  A two-dimensional description of
our collapsed diagram establishes: 
If two triangles are placed so that
the straight lines connecting
corresponding sides meet in a point,
then the points of intersection of
corresponding sides will lie upon a
common line.
As such, this proposition is called Desargues' theorem, after the seventeenth
century mathematician who found it roughly through the "projective" reasoning we
have just sketched.  What intrigued Hilbert about this proof is that it utilizes
elementary reasoning about a three dimensional configuration in order to establish
a two dimensional fact.  He wondered whether there is any way to obtain the
theorem without departing the plane.  Accordingly, he isolated the principles
needed to effect our "projective" reasoning  in a subgroup of axioms and asked:27
can we derive Desargues' theorem if we only employ the plane geometry versions
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of these axioms?  In other words, can the two dimensional inhabitants of E.
Abbott's Flatland establish Desargues' theorem for their homeland in a manner that
avoids the lift into three dimensions that we used?  Hilbert discovered that this is
possible only if the Flatlanders rely upon a significantly wider array of concepts
than we did (the easiest purely planar proofs of Desargues' theorem involve
considerations of measurement that were completely absent in our solid geometry
treatment).  Hilbert established this "independence" of Desargues' theorem from
the planar "projective" axioms by constructing funny models of the axioms in
which Desargues' theorem failed.
Underlying this investigation is an assumption that Hilbert's technique of
"testing independence by models" allows us to fix what we might call "the
intellectual orbit" spanned by a given set of concepts.  By such studies, Hilbert
hoped to establish how far a given set of ideas could stretch and, if they proved
insufficient to fix all of the facts demanded by the language of geometry, to search
for further axioms that could bring the subject into a satisfactory complete closure. 
He wrote,
[W]e can formulate our main question as follows: What are the
necessary and sufficient conditions, independent from each other, to
which a system of things has to be subject so that to each property of
these things there corresponds a geometrical fact, and conversely--
that is, so that there is a complete and simple picture of geometrical
reality.28
In public lectures, Hilbert claimed that these discoveries delineated a surprising
"fine structure" within our intuition--e.g., that "projective intuition" reaches less far
in the plane than in space.   29
But such a representation of what his results signify would surely raise the
hackles of someone working within the relative logicist tradition.  According to its
appraisal of "logic"'s capabilities, Hilbert's alleged conceptual orbits are far too
circumscribed.  After all, employing Plücker's and von Staudt's techniques, logic
allows us to carve a plane into a wide choice of different dimensionalities and to
add complex point supplementaries that render a normal Euclidean plane
effectively four-dimensional.  Any talk of the "fine structure" of intuition should
seem pure nonsense; Kantian "intuition" comes to us as indivisible totality.  If we
want to prove Desargues' theorem in the plane projectively, let logic first create
new structures that will lift our two dimensional triangle into three dimensions and
then transfer intuitive appearances onto this abstract construction.  Once this is
accomplished, our undivided Kantian intuition tells us, by reproducing the
argument sketched above, that the three dimensional version of Desargues' theorem
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holds for our "lifted" structure.  Collapsing everything back into the plane, we
obtain a "planar proof" of Desargues' theorem without citing anything except logic
and "projective intuition".  Indeed, Frege employed such techniques himself ;30
"transferred property" demonstrations from one dimension to another were very
common in higher geometry.  Clearly, on this way of looking at the issues,
Hilbert's discussion of the "independence" of various groups of axioms would
appear as incoherent as Frege, without much overt explanation, claims it to be.
What lies at the core of this dispute, of course, is a significant disagreement
about the scope of logic.  Without clearly recognizing that he has done so, Hilbert
has tacitly adopted a position approximating to what we now consider a first order
logic understanding of logical consequence.   Shortly after the Hilbert/Frege31
exchanges, this fundamental difference in logical appraisal played a significant role
in inducing a methodological outcome that Frege must have found outrageous: the
rapid abandonment of the entire relative logicist program within geometry. 
Although this fact is not obvious from The Foundations of Geometry itself, Hilbert
shared the naïve structuralist dream that mathematicians should feel free to cook up
any internally consistent realm they please, unfettered by tethers to more familiar
mathematical territory.  Since he expected that the intellectual orbit natural to a
specified collection of concepts can be brought into tidy axiomatic closure, he
hoped that, through adequate formalization, a set of principles can be articulated
that will completely settle all propositions pertinent to a specified range of ideas. 
As long as such axioms can be proved consistent, a mathematician needn't have
any qualms that she has articulated a proper arena for mathematical investigation,
for the truth-value of all claims in the theory have been settled by the axioms. 
Hilbert wrote Frege: 
Of course I must also be able to do as I please in the matter of
positing characteristics; for as soon as I have posited an axiom, it will
exist and be "true"... If the arbitrarily posited axioms together with all
their consequences do not contradict one another, then they are true
and the things defined by these axioms exist.  For me, this is the
criterion of truth and existence.32
If this axiomatized chastening of naïve structuralism can be made viable, then, at
one stroke, all of the painful stagewise constructions of a von Staudt can be
avoided.  If you believe that Euclidean geometry can be better understood if ideal
points are added, directly specify through axioms the richer structure you seek and
then show how Euclidean geometry can be embedded within it.  Don't waste time
building up what you seek out as improbable sections of some preestablished
domain .  Mathematical liberals like Hilbert and Poincare had long worried that33
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overly cautious restrictions on mathematical ontologizing as advocated by a von
Staudt or Weierstrass might hamper the "free creativity" required in the genuine
mathematician.  Hilbert's axiom-based structuralism presented the hope that such
worries could be avoided. 
It was the almost instantaneous popularity of this "structures can be
independently specified through axiomatics" point of view that drove relative
logicism into geometrical oblivion.  Post-Hilbertian commentators often
sarcastically dismissed efforts like von Staudt's as motivated by antiquated, "extra-
mathematical" demands upon mathematical existence.  Thus the irrepressible E.T.
Bell:
In proving that geometry could, conceivably, get along without
analysis, von Staudt simultaneously demonstrated the utter futility of
such a parthnogenetic mode of propagation, should all geometers
ever be singular enough to insist upon an exclusive indulgence in
unnatural practices.  34
The historical irony in all this is that Hilbert, as is now well known, had
underestimated the barriers that prevent axiomatic consistency from being
established by elementary means.  As Kurt Gödel established in his famous second
incompleteness theorem, we usually can prove the consistency of a given
axiomatic system only if we assume the consistency of some yet stronger theory. 
So once again the problem that sank naïve structuralism returns: how do we
ascertain when we're not dreaming of an inconsistent structure? 
The collapse of Hilbertian hopes for elementary checks on consistency thus
forced questions of mathematical existence ultimately into the unwelcome arms of
modern set theory (to those who find sets “unnatural”).  Out of sheer necessity, set
theory has become our final arbiter of mathematical existence, occasioning the
doctrine I dubbed "modern mathematical orthodoxy" at the start of this paper.  But
how can we philosophically defend the claim that the mathematical existence of
everything else should rest upon the dictates of this rather abstruse theory? 
According to the classic defence offered by Kurt Gödel  himself, set theory of35
roughly Zermelo-Fraenkel type should be favored because (i) we possess various
"intuitions" about sets that conform to many of the basic ingredients found within
that theory and (ii) Zermelo-Fraenkel also offers as our best vehicle for organizing
all mathematical activity, just as the postulation of unseen atoms optimally
underwrites the behavior witnessed in macroscopic objects.  But if such
considerations are the best we can offer in defence of set theoretic primacy,
consider what a wierd trajectory philosophy of mathematics has followed over the
past two centuries.  Relative logicism was originally born in the hopes that
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mathematics could be liberated from the hazy and quasi-empirical appeals to
expediency found in a Poncelet or Kummer.  As we've seen, sets entered
mathematics largely as a tool for restoring traditional certainty to mathematics
while accomodating needed extension elements.  Yet Gödel's defence of set theory
doesn't differ much in its essentials from that offered by a Kummer or Poncelet,
except that now we're now expected to possess sundry "intuitions" about very large
sets, rather than simply about plain old Euclidean geometry and arithmetic.  
Indeed, an odd tension stands at the heart of Gödelian set theoretic
absolutism.  From the practices of, inter alia, nineteenth century relational logicists
like Frege, modern mathematics has acquired a sharp taste for rigor, yet all of that
rigor is now directed towards a core structure that we philosophically justify in the
smoozy, inductive manner of the physicist.  If that's what our standards of
mathematical existence eventually come down to, why shouldn't we behave equally
"inductively" with respect to derivation?  Physicists, after all, positively revel in
their loose employment of what the mathematician Miklin calls "Rabelesian" proof
techniques.  But why should mathematicians behave any differently?
Of course, it would be impossible to cram all of modern mathematics back
into the timid confines tolerated by relational logicism, but if one does not
sympathize with their attempts to justify new structures according to a coherent
diagnosis of mathematics' sources of validity, then one has probably not adequately
appreciated the difficulties that still attach to questions of mathematical ontology in
our time. 
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